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Abstract
The recent advancement in cyberphysical systems (e.g., transportation, water manage-
ment, energy distribution system, etc.) has led to an exponential growth in the use of
automated devices which in turn has created new security challenges. By manipulating
cyberphysical components, a potential cyber/physical attacker can modify the capacities
of multiple edges so as to disrupt the network of interest and reduce the amount of flow
going through the network. In this paper, we study the robust and adaptive maximum flow
problem in a network so as to proactively counter such adversarial failures. Existing ro-
bust network flow models typically assume that the entire flow of an attacked edge gets
lost. However, in many practical systems, the flow of an attacked edge could potentially
be rerouted through adjacent edges with residual capacity. In order to address this feature,
we propose a robust and sustainable network flow model to effectively counter possible
attacking behaviors of an adversary operating under a budget constraint. Specifically, we
introduce a novel scenario generation approach based on an iterative two-player game be-
tween a defender and an adversary. We assume that the adversary always takes a best
response (out of some feasible attacking scenarios) against the current flow scenario pre-
pared by the defender. On the other hand, we assume that the defender considers all the
attacking behaviors revealed by the adversary in previous iterations in order to generate a
new conservative flow strategy that is robust (maximin) against those attacks. This itera-
tive game continues until the objectives of the adversary and the administrator converge.
We show that the robust network flow problem to be solved by the defender is NP-hard
and that the complexity of the adversary’s decision problem grows exponentially with the
∗Most of this work was done while the author was with Singapore MIT Alliance for Research and Technology
(SMART) Center for Future Mobility (FM).
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network size and the adversary’s budget value. We propose two principled heuristic ap-
proaches for solving the adversary’s problem at the scale of a large urban network. Exten-
sive computational results on multiple synthetic and real-world data sets demonstrate that
the solution provided by the defender’s problem significantly increases the amount of flow
pushed through the network and reduces the expected lost flow over four state-of-the-art
benchmark approaches.
1 Introduction
Cyberphysical systems (CPSs) are deployed extensively in modern critical infrastructure sys-
tems including urban transportation, water management, energy distribution, and telecommu-
nication systems. For example, a wide range of sensors and automated devices are installed
at the road intersections of urban transportation for real-time traffic monitoring and intelligent
traffic light management. While the proliferation of automated devices in CPSs provides many
benefits (e.g., real-time monitoring, better sensing, data-centric planning, etc.) to the authori-
ties, they are exposed to new security challenges, e.g., traffic light manipulation, tampering of
sensors, destruction of transformers, etc. Several illustrations of cyberphysical attacks such as
tampering of traffic monitoring sensors (Zetter 2012, Reilly et al. 2015, Cerrudo 2014), ma-
nipulation of signal controllers (Ghena et al. 2014, Jacobs 2014) have been reported in recent
past. By manipulating cyberphysical components of an edge, a malicious attacker can either
break the edge completely or modify its capacity. In the context of transportation, an attacker
can either set the traffic light to red or reduce the duration of green light (which is equivalent to
capacity drop) by manipulating the sensors embedded in streets that feed data to traffic control
systems.
There can be two principle ways to counter these strategic malicious attacks and to develop
resilient and sustainable cyberphysical systems: (a) Reactive approach – the network admin-
istrator immediately dispatches available resources to recover the compromised edges for fast
network restoration; and (b) Proactive approach – the network administrator strategically cir-
culates the traffic flow to maximize the amount of flow that can be pushed to the destination
node under worst-case adversarial attack. The malicious attacks can also be countered using
a combination of both the reactive and proactive approaches. This paper focuses on proactive
and robust planning for resilient control of cyberphysical systems. In other words, we consider
the network flow problem in the framework of robust optimization (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski
1998, Bertsimas and Sim 2003) as the network structure is itself uncertain due to the possibility
of (adversarial) edge failures (Bertsimas et al. 2013).
Our goal is to solve the robust network flow problem where the network administrator
proactively plans to route a maximum amount of flow through the network by considering all
the possible attacking behaviors of an adversary operating under a budget constraint. The ro-
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bust network flow problem is motivated by the classical network interdiction problem (Wood
1993, Cormican et al. 1998, Sullivan and Cole Smith 2014) where a felonious entity carries
illegal goods through the network and an interdictor places resources (e.g., security personnel)
to inspect a subset of edges so as to detect and prevent the illegal activity. Many sequential
and simultaneous game-theoretical models have been proposed to solve network interdiction
problems (Washburn and Wood 1995, Bertsimas et al. 2016, Dahan and Amin 2015). Guo
et al. (2016) propose a repeated game to solve the network interdiction problem and provide
a column generation method to solve the repeated Stackelberg game with minimax objective.
Another similar problem domain which has been solved effectively using game-theoretic mod-
els is strategic network design for critical infrastructure systems where the goal is to optimize
a certain utility function by considering the possibility of edge failure (Laporte et al. 2010,
Dziubin´ski and Goyal 2013). However, different from the objectives in network interdiction
problems or strategic network design problems for critical infrastructure, our goal is to find
a robust and adaptive flow strategy whereby an administrator is able to maximize the effec-
tive flow that can be pushed through the network under worst-case adversarial attacks possibly
through rerouting.
Another relevant research theme focuses on identifying critical and vulnerable edges in a
network (Wu and Amin 2018, Wu et al. 2018) and designing simultaneous attacker-defender
game. Dahan et al. (2018) propose a simultaneous attacker-defender network flow game and
show that the simultaneous game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if both the adversary
and administrator are restricted to a fixed budget constraint. From the resulting mixed strategy,
they further derive the properties of other Nash equilibria for that game. However, they did
not consider the option to reroute flows from an attacked edge. The robust and adaptive net-
work flow problem was introduced by Bertsimas et al. (2013) to tackle the situation where the
network structure (i.e., nodes and edges) is itself uncertain. For computing an adaptive max-
imum flow solution, they assume that the flow can be adjusted after the arc failure occurred,
but the adjusted flow is always bounded by the initial flow assigned to an edge. They propose
a linear optimization model to approximately solve the problem. However, we experimentally
show that the proposed approximate solution performs poorly when the flow from an attacked
edge is allowed to reroute through adjacent edges with residual capacity. In addition, to make
the problem more realistic, we assume that the administrator faces a fixed cost for routing one
unit of flow through an edge, which increases the complexity of the optimization problem for
computing an adaptive maximum flow solution.
Due to the aforementioned challenges, it is hard to formulate a tractable optimization prob-
lem for computing a robust and adaptive maximum flow solution using two-stage robust model.
Therefore, we treat the problem of computing a robust and adaptive maximum flow strategy as
the result of a two-player iterative game between a network administrator and an adversary. We
assume that the adversary is operating under a budget constraint (i.e., the number of attacked
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edges is bounded by a threshold value) and therefore, the adversary has a finite number of pos-
sible attacking choices. For the administrator, a feasible flow strategy should satisfy the flow
conservation constraint at the nodes and the capacity constraint at the edges. As the strategy
space of the administrator is extremely large and the attacker’s strategy space grows exponen-
tially with the budget, it is impossible to compute an equilibrium solution by considering all the
pure strategies. To tackle such large strategy space, a common practice is to use an incremental
strategy generation approach for choosing a small set of pure strategies which can be used to
identify an equilibrium solution. Jain et al. (2011) propose a double oracle algorithm where
both the players use best response against each other to incrementally generate their strategies
and show that this iterative approach converges to a Stackelberg equilibrium. The final solution
at the convergence is a mixed strategy (i.e., probabilistic distribution over the incrementally
generated pure strategies) for both the player, which can readily be applied in a physical se-
curity scheduling (e.g., security patrolling in airport or physical road network) domain as both
attacker and defender execute their actions simultaneously. In contrast, we assume that the ad-
versary is more powerful and has a perfect knowledge of the pure flow strategy chosen by the
administrator. Therefore, our goal is to identify a reliable pure strategy for the administrator
that maximizes the worst-case adaptive flow value.
In order to solve the iterative two-player game and to identify a reliable pure strategy for the
administrator, we propose a novel incremental strategy generation approach. In each iteration
of the game, the adversary who is restricted to a budget constraint, acts as a follower and
optimally disrupts the current network flow strategy prepared by the network administrator.
In turn, the administrator acts as a leader and generates a new network flow strategy which
is robust (maximin) against all the attacking behaviors revealed in previous iterations. This
iterative game continues until the players start repeating their previous actions. At that point,
as the adversary repeats her previous attacks, the administrator has already considered these
for generating the final flow strategy and therefore, it is a robust (maximin) response to the
adversary’s best response. In that sense, the iterative game has reached convergence. Note that,
unlike the solution approaches for traditional Stackelberg games (e.g., double oracle algorithm)
that converge to a mixed strategy equilibrium, our solution converges to a pure and reliable
robust flow strategy for the administrator.
As the administrator model adds additional constraints related to current attack on top of
decision model from previous iteration, the objective of the administrator reduces monotoni-
cally over the iterations. Due to more conservative flow, the adversarys ability to disrupt the
flow strategy reduces over iterations and the objective of the adversary increases. These two
objective values are guaranteed to converge at some point. We show that the game converges
to a maximin optimal flow solution for the administrator and therefore, the objective of the
administrator will be lower bounded by the value at which the game has converged for any
realization of the feasible attacking scenarios.
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The assumption of budget constraint for the adversary is valid in many cyberphysical attack-
ing scenarios and therefore, several existing works (Bertsimas et al. 2013, Altner et al. 2010,
Dahan et al. 2018) assume a budget constraint for the adversary to control the conservatism of
robust solutions. As an example of practical consideration about such constraint, an adversary
would need to be present physically within the geographical proximity in order to manipulate
vehicle monitoring sensors which indirectly impact the traffic light timings (Cerrudo 2014),
implying a (human) resource budget constraint for the adversary. While the adversary’s budget
value can be learnt efficiently from previous attacking behaviors in case of repeated attacks,
we also experimentally show that the initial estimation of the budget value can be done using
sensitivity analysis (i.e., by observing the outcomes with varying budget value).
We show that the robust and adaptive network flow problem to be solved by the admin-
istrator is NP-hard. Moreover, we empirically observe that the complexity of the adversary’s
decision problem grows exponentially with the network size and adversary’s budget value.
Therefore, we propose two principled heuristic approaches for solving the complex decision
problem of the adversary at the scale of a large urban network. The first heuristic is an ac-
celerated greedy approach where we identify one edge at a time in an incremental fashion to
minimize the traffic flow reaching the destination for a given flow strategy, until the budget
constraint of the adversary is exhausted. For the second heuristic, we partition the network
into disjoint sub-networks and identify a set of edges to attack within the adversary’s budget
constraint by solving the corresponding sub-problems. We iteratively solve this process with
random partitioning of the network and learn a set of best possible candidate edges to attack
and finally, solve the adversary’s decision problem to choose the best edges (within budget con-
straint) from these candidate edges. In each iteration of the game, we solve both the heuristics
and choose the one with better solution quality as the adversary’s decision. By leveraging the
computational effectiveness of the proposed heuristics, our solution approach can scale grace-
fully to large-scale problems while providing a consistent performance gain over four following
benchmark approaches: (i) The administrator sends maximum flow through the network with-
out considering any attacks; (ii) The administrator uses a myopic one-step reasoning against
the adversary’s behavior to choose a flow strategy; (iii) A robust maximum flow solution from
Bertsimas et al. (2013) where the administrator proactively computes a flow solution to im-
prove the worst-case performance; and (iv) An approximate adaptive maximum flow solution
adopted from Bertsimas et al. (2013).
Our contributions. The key contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We formally define the problem of computing a robust and adaptive maximum flow strat-
egy for urban networks by exploiting the fact that the flow of a compromised edge might
be rerouted through adjacent edges with residual capacity. To solve the problem, we
propose an iterative two-player game between a network administrator and an adversary
which is referred as Traffic Network Flow Game (TNFG).
5
2. We develop novel optimization models to solve the decision problem of both players in
each iteration of the game. The administrator’s optimization model takes into account all
the attacking strategies generated by the adversary in previous iterations and computes a
robust flow strategy that maximizes the amount of flow pushed through the network in
the worst-case over all the previous attacks. The adversary’s decision problem inspects
the flow strategy generated the administrator in the current iteration and generates an
attacking strategy (out of the feasible attacking scenarios under a given budget constraint)
to optimally disrupt the flow strategy.
3. We propose two novel heuristic approaches for solving the complex decision problem of
the adversary at the scale of a large urban network. The first heuristic is an accelerated
greedy approach that incrementally identifies the best edges to be attacked. The second
heuristic is a network-partitioning based approach that iteratively identifies a set of candi-
date edges in the network and then we solve the adversary’s decision problem over these
candidate edges.
4. We provide extensive computational results on multiple synthetic and real-world bench-
mark data sets to demonstrate that our proposed solution approach scales gracefully to
large-scale problems and significantly increases the amount of flow pushed through the
network over the benchmark approaches.
Structure of the paper. In §2, we elaborate on the relevant research. In §3, we formally
describe our problem by allowing the flow of an attacked edge to be rerouted through adjacent
edges with residual capacity. In §4, we demonstrate our proposed iterative two-player game
between a network administrator and an adversary. We present the decision problem and opti-
mization models for the adversary and the administrator in §4.1 and §4.2, respectively. In §4.3,
we provide the key iterative steps of our overall two-player game. In §5, we present experi-
mental setup and results to verify the utility of our proposed solution approach on small-scale
problem instances. In §6, we describe two heuristic approaches to quickly solve the adversary’s
decision problem. In §6.1, we explain the accelerated greedy heuristic and in §6.2, we describe
the network partitioning based heuristic. In §7, we demonstrate the experimental results on
large-scale problem instances by leveraging the computational effectiveness of the proposed
heuristics. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in §8.
2 Related Work
Given the practical importance of ensuring cyberphysical security in critical urban infrastruc-
ture systems and evaluating the resilience and sustainability of such systems, several game-
theoretic models have been proposed to model the attacker-defender interactions (Manshaei
et al. 2013). To situate these contributions, we summarize along the following four threads of
6
research: (a) Network interdiction and strategic network design; (b) Security games in critical
cyberphysical infrastructure systems; (c) Stackelberg games for ensuring physical security; and
(d) Robust optimization.
2.1 Network Interdiction and Strategic Network Design
The robust network flow problem is motivated by the network interdiction problem where a
malicious entity carries illegal goods through the network and a security agency deploy a set
of interdictors to prevent the illegal activity. Due to its practical importance in defense and
drug enforcement, a wide variety of research papers have addressed both deterministic (Wood
1993) or stochastic (Cormican et al. 1998) network interdiction problems. Several research
(Wollmer 1964, Ratliff et al. 1975, Ball et al. 1989) propose methodologies for identifying the
most important edges in the network within a specific budget constraint which can recommend
a deterministic interdiction strategy. For solving the network interdiction problem in Euclidean
space, Sullivan and Cole Smith (2014) provide a sequence of integer programs to iteratively
identify the upper and lower bounds on solution quality and show that these bounds are conver-
gent. Many sequential and simultaneous game-theoretical models have been proposed recently
to solve network interdiction problem. Washburn and Wood (1995) propose a two-player zero-
sum game to compute a probabilistic edge selection strategy for the interdictors. Bertsimas
et al. (2016) introduce an arc-based and a path-based formulation to solve the sequential net-
work interdiction game where the interdictor iteratively chooses a pure strategy and then the
other player routes a feasible flow through the network. Game-theoretic models are widely
adopted to solve other relevant class of problems that exhibit similar characteristics to the net-
work interdiction problem such as strategic network design (Laporte et al. 2010, Dziubin´ski
and Goyal 2013) for critical infrastructure systems (e.g., railways and defense) where the goal
is to optimize a certain utility function by considering the possibility of edge failure. On the
contrary to network interdiction or strategic network design problem, we focus on identifying
a robust flow strategy to improve operational efficiency of cyberphysical systems where the
network is vulnerable to strategic attacks. Bertsimas et al. (2013) propose a robust and adap-
tive network flow models to proactively counter edge failures by assuming that the flow can
be adjusted after the edge failure occurred, but the adjusted flow is bounded by the initial flow
assigned to an edge. In contrast, we propose a two-player iterative game to solve a generic
problem by considering the fact that the flow of an attacked edge might be rerouted through
adjacent edges with residual capacity.
2.2 Security Games in Critical Cyberphysical Infrastructure
Our work closely resembles the broader research theme of network security games in critical
infrastructure systems. Security games have been employed to defend vulnerable nodes and
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edges in urban applications including transportation (Baykal-Guersoy et al. 2014), shipment
of hazardous material (Szeto 2013) and communication networks (Gueye et al. 2012). Gueye
and Marbukh (2012) use a game-theoretic approach to compute the right trade-off between the
vulnerability and the security cost for supply-demand networks. They model an operator who
transmits a feasible flow through the network and an attacker, who faces a fixed cost for attack-
ing an edge, seeks to maximize the amount of lost flow by disrupting an edge. They show that
the game converges to a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. In contrast, we allow the adversary
to disrupt multiple edges simultaneously within a fixed budget constraint and propose an itera-
tive game to identify a robust flow strategy for the operators. Prior research papers (Assadi et al.
2014, Dwivedi and Yu 2013) have designed solution approaches that are built upon the max-
flow and min-cut theorem for the analysis of vulnerability in complex urban networks. Several
recent research works (Dahan et al. 2018, He et al. 2012, Ma et al. 2011) have also designed
simultaneous attacker-defender network flow games and provide methodologies for identify-
ing critical and vulnerable edges in the network (Wu and Amin 2018, Wu et al. 2018). Dahan
and Amin (2015) and Dahan et al. (2018) employ the max-flow and min-cut theorem within a
simultaneous game framework to model the attacker-defender interaction. The simultaneous
game efficiently captures the strategic uncertainty on the adversary’s behavior, and the game
has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if both the adversary and administrator are restricted to
a fixed budget constraint. However, they did not consider the option to reroute flows through
the adjacent edges with residual capacity. Therefore, we develop an efficient technique using
an iterative game to identify a robust flow strategy for an urban network where the flow of an
attacked edge can be rerouted through other paths.
2.3 Stackelberg Games in Physical Security
Another relevant area of research in security game has focused on identifying optimal Stackel-
berg strategies (Tsai et al. 2010, Kar et al. 2017). These leader-follower based sequential games
have been applied successfully in many real-world applications ranging from security patrolling
(Pita et al. 2008, Brown et al. 2014) to wild-life protection (Fang et al. 2016) to opportunistic
crime (Zhang et al. 2016) to cyber security (Sinha et al. 2015). The fundamental concept be-
hind these problems resembles network interdiction problem where security personnel need to
be allocated to defend adversarial events. However, solving these large normal-form Stackel-
berg games are practically challenging and therefore, sophisticated methods are needed to speed
up the solution process by exploiting the specific domain structure. To identify a randomized
patrolling strategy for large-scale infrastructure protection, Jain et al. (2010) propose a com-
bination of column generation and branch-and-bound algorithm that exploits the network flow
representation of the problem and iteratively generates tighter bounds using fast and efficient
algorithms. In the similar direction, Guo et al. (2016) develop a column and constraint gener-
ation algorithm to approximately solve the network security game. Jain et al. (2011) employ a
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double oracle algorithm to solve the network security game. On the contrary to enumerating
the entire exponential sized strategy space for the players, the proposed double oracle algo-
rithm generates the oracle for the attacker and the defender by adding their pure strategy best
response in each iteration and finally compute an equilibrium solution for the restricted game
consisting of pure strategy oracles of both the players. The final solution at the convergence
is a mixed strategy for both the player, which can be applied in a physical security scheduling
domain as both the players execute their actions simultaneously. However, these approaches
cannot be readily employed to solve our problem as we have exponential sized strategy space
and for each pair of attacker and defender strategy, we need to solve an optimization model
(due to the fact that the flow can be rerouted through other paths in case of adversarial attacks)
to compute the payoff value. In addition, we assume that the adversary is more powerful and
has a perfect knowledge of the flow strategy chosen by the administrator and therefore, we need
to identify a reliable and robust pure strategy for the administrator.
2.4 Robust Optimization
The last thread of research which is complementary to our work presented in this paper is on
data-driven robust optimization. Robust optimization is a broad research area and the solu-
tion methodology varies for different problem settings (Bertsimas et al. 2011, 2018). Several
research efforts have been made to design robust solutions with different objective functions
such as worst-case (Vorobyov et al. 2003, Ghosh et al. 2016), regret (Ahmed et al. 2013) and
risk sensitive (Adulyasak and Jaillet 2015) objectives. The design of robust optimization solu-
tion also varies with different types of uncertainty sets such as ellipsoidal (Bertsimas and Sim
2004) and interval (Li and Azarm 2008) uncertainty sets. Our proposed iterative game and
incremental strategy generation approach can be adopted for data-driven robust optimization
with worst-case objective and interval uncertainty set.
3 Problem Formulation
We begin with a formal definition of the Traffic Network Flow Game (TNFG). Let G = 〈V , E〉
denote an urban network, where V symbolizes the set of nodes and s, t ∈ V represent the source
and terminal node, respectively. E denotes the set of edges, where eij ∈ E represents a directed
edge from node i to node j. We also denote an edge simply as e ∈ E and assume that it has
a finite capacity Ue (corresponding to the maximum amount of traffic that can be sent through
the edge). We introduce an artificial edge ets with infinite capacity between the terminal node
and the source node. In addition, we introduce the following notations:
• δ+v : The set of incoming edges to node v. For the source node s, δ+s includes the artificial
edge ets.
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• δ−v : The set of outgoing edges from node v. For the terminal node t, δ−t includes the
artificial edge ets.
• Λv: The set of all possible simple paths (i.e., without any internal cycles) from node v to
terminal node t.
• Λσ =
⋃
v∈σ Λv: The set of all possible simple paths from one of the node of set σ to
terminal node, t.
• Γ: Budget for the adversary. That is to say, a maximum of Γ edges can be attacked.
A flow scenario x is a function x : E → R≥0 that assigns a non-negative flow value xe
to each edge e ∈ E such that the following capacity and flow conservation constraints (1) are
ensured: ∑
e∈δ+v
xe −
∑
e∈δ−v
xe = 0 ∀v ∈ V \ {s}
xe ≤ Ue ∀e ∈ E
xe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E
(1)
Let X denote the set of all possible flow scenarios that satisfy the flow conservation con-
straints (1). An attacking scenario µ is a function µ : E → {0, 1}, where µe is set to 1 if
the edge e ∈ E is attacked by the adversary and 0 otherwise. The set of possible attacking
scenarios that satisfy the budget constraint of the adversary is denoted by Ψ.
Ψ :=
{
µ = (µe)e∈E ∈ {0, 1}|E|
∣∣∣∑
e
µe ≤ Γ
}
(2)
We now describe the traffic network flow game in the context of urban networks where the
flow of an attacked edge might be rerouted through adjacent edges with residual capacity. In a
fully secured network, the optimal strategy for the network administrator is to adopt one of the
Max-Flow solutions (Ford and Fulkerson 1956). However, in case of an adversarial attack, the
Max-Flow solution is not necessarily an optimal strategy. Therefore, our goal is to find a robust
flow strategy for the network administrator against the worst-case attacking scenario from Ψ.
We first provide the additional setup needed to describe the problem. If the adversary
attacks an edge e ∈ E (i.e., µe = 1), then the capacity of the edge is modified from Ue to
me. We set the value of me to 0, if the edge is completely blocked. We assume that the
administrator faces a fixed cost for routing or rerouting one unit of flow through a particular
edge. Let pe denote the cost for routing or rerouting one unit of flow through edge e ∈ E and
W denote the reward for successfully getting one unit of flow to the destination node. If the
sum of initial routing cost and rerouting cost (due to attacks) for pushing one unit of flow to the
destination node exceeds W , then an optimal strategy is to send zero flow through the network.
To avoid such situation, we assume that the value of pe is always upper bounded by W2L , where L
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represents the maximum number of edges in a source to destination path. The cost for routing
one unit of flow through the artificial edge pets is set to 0.
In this setting, given an initial flow x and a resulting attacking scenario µ, we can com-
pute the maximum adaptive value of x for the administrator after rerouting flows, M(x, µ), by
solving the following linear optimization (LO) model (3)-(8), where ye denotes the resulting
amount of flow going through edge e ∈ E and ze represents the amount of additional flow that
is being rerouted through edge e due to the disruption from the attacking scenario µ. The ob-
jective function (3) of the LO model computes the trade-off between maximizing the ultimate
flow that can be pushed to the terminal node (which is equivalent to the flow y(t,s) of the arti-
ficial edge ets) and minimizing the total rerouting cost of the additional flow from the attacked
edges1. It should be noted that, herein and throughout the rest of the paper we fix the value of
W to 1 (i.e., pe ≤ 12L ).
M(x, µ) = max
{
Wy(t,s) −
∑
e
peze
}−∑
e
pexe (3)
s.t.
∑
e∈δ+v
ye −
∑
e∈δ−v
ye ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V \ s (4)
ye = xe ∀e /∈ Λσµ (5)
ye ≤ (1− µe)Ue + µeme ∀e ∈ Λσµ (6)
ze ≥ ye − xe ∀e ∈ Λσµ (7)
ye ≥ 0; ze ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E (8)
As a portion of the flow might be lost due to the attack, we employ a weaker notion of flow
conservation at the nodes using constraints (4) to avoid infeasibility issues. Let σµ denote the
set of source nodes of the attacked edges for attacking scenario µ. As indicated earlier, Λσµ
represents the set of all possible paths from any of the nodes of set σµ to the terminal node.
If an edge e does not belong to any of these paths, then the flow through that edge will not be
impacted and therefore, using constraints (5), the LO model ensures that the value of ye is equal
to the input flow value xe. For all the other edges which belong to one of the paths in Λσµ , there
can be two possibilities: (a) If the edge e is attacked, then we can send maximum me amount
of flow through the edge; and (b) If the edge is not attacked, then we can send maximum Ue
amount of traffic flow through edge e. We combine these two possibilities and represent them
using constraints (6). Finally, constraints (7)-(8) insure the amount of rerouted flow for edge e,
ze = max(0, ye − xe).
1As the input flow scenario x is fixed, the initial flow routing cost (i.e.,
∑
e pexe) is constant in the objective
function (3).
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Figure 1: Illustration of resulting flow after an attack in a network.
Example 3.1 We provide an illustrative example in Figure 1 to better explain the constraints
in the LO model. In this example, we have six nodes and nine edges. We show an initial flow
solution x in the first network, where each pair of numbers represents the traffic flow and the
capacity for that particular edge. Assume that the adversary can attack a maximum of one edge
in the network. Assume the adversary attacks the edge e1t and the resulting flow in that edge
is set 0. As the flow of edge e1t can only be rerouted through edge e13 and e3t, the resulting
flows for all the other edges remain the same. The resulting flow after the attack is shown in the
second network where the blue dotted line shows the augmented path through which the flow
of the attacked edge is being rerouted.
Given an initial flow strategy x chosen by the administrator, the adversary observes the flow
and executes an attacking scenario that optimally disrupts the flow x. Therefore, for a given
flow x, an optimal attacking scenario µ(x) and the objective of the adversary (also referred as
the adaptive value of x) AV (x)is defined as follows:
µ(x) ∈ arg min
µ∈Ψ
M(x, µ)
AV (x) = min
µ∈Ψ
M(x, µ)
(9)
Finally, the goal of the network administrator is to identify a robust and reliable flow strat-
egy which has the maximum adaptive value. Therefore, the objective of the administrator is
defined as follows:
max
x∈X
AV (x) = max
x∈X
M(x, µ(x)) (10)
Lemma 1 The problem of computing a robust and adaptive maximum flow strategy to be solved
by the administrator from expression (10) is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. The adaptive maximum flow problem introduced by Bertsimas et al. (2013) is a related
problem where one can adjust the flow solution after every realization of edge failure by assum-
ing that the adjusted flow is bounded by the initial flow assigned to an edge. Bertsimas et al.
(2013) show that the adaptive maximum flow problem is strongly NP-hard by reducing it to a
classical network interdiction problem (Wood 1993). Our robust and adaptive maximum flow
12
problem can be reduced to the adaptive maximum flow problem if we restrict the adjusted flow
for an edge to be upper bounded by the initial flow assigned to it. Due to this trivial reduction to
the adaptive maximum flow problem which is strongly NP-Hard, our problem is also strongly
NP-Hard. 
4 Solution Approach
In this section, we describe an iterative sequence of best-response plays between the adminis-
trator and an adversary to solve the problem defined in §3. In the first iteration of the game,
the administrator assumes that no attack is planned in the system and computes a flow solution
that maximizes the amount of incoming flow to the destination node. Next, the adversary finds
an optimal attacking scenario to disrupt the flow solution computed by the administrator. In
the subsequent iterations, the administrator considers all the attacking scenarios revealed by
the adversary in previous iterations and finds a robust (maximin) strategy against those attacks.
The adversary always computes the best myopic disruption against the flow solution revealed
by the administrator in the current iteration. This iterative process continues until the objectives
of both the players converge. We now describe the details of the optimization problems to be
solved by the adversary and by the administrator during each iteration of the game.
4.1 Optimization Problem for the Adversary
Once the administrator reveals a flow scenario x¯, the adversary solves the problem (9) to gen-
erate an attacking scenario that optimally disrupt the flow x¯ by considering the fact that the
administrator can reroute the flow of an attacked edge through other paths with residual ca-
pacity. We now provide an alternative formulation of the problem (9) so as to mathematically
represent the notion of rerouting paths. The set of expressions (11)-(18) illustrates the alterna-
tive decision problem for the adversary. The objective function (11) corresponds to finding the
attacking scenario µ that minimizes the resulting objective of the administrator, represented by
the inner maximization problem. Constraints (12) ensure a weaker notion of the flow conserva-
tion at each node and constraints (13) enforce the capacity constraint on the flow at each edge.
Let ρe denote the set of edges, which if attacked, can have a portion of their flows rerouted
through edge e, i.e.,
ρe = {(u, v) = e′ ∈ E|e ∈ Λu}
Let pie denote a variable which is set to 0 if none of the edges in the set ρe is attacked.
Then, constraints (14) enforce that the flow passing through an edge e is bounded by the given
flow x¯e if none of the edges in ρe is attacked (i.e., pie = 0). Constraints (15) and (17) assure
that the value of pie is set to 0 if none of edges in set ρe is attacked, and otherwise the value
of pie is set to 1. Finally, the additional flow rerouted through edge e, ze can be computed
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as max(0, ye − x¯e). However, as the inner objective function minimizes the rerouting cost,
constraints (16) are sufficient alone to accurately compute the value of ze.
min
µ∈Ψ
{
max y(t,s) −
∑
e∈E
pe · ze
}
(11)
s.t.
∑
e∈δ+v
ye −
∑
e∈δ−v
ye ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V \ s (12)
ye ≤ (1− µe)Ue + µeme ∀e ∈ E (13)
ye ≤ (1− pie)x¯e + pie · Ue ∀e ∈ E (14)
pie ≤
∑
e′∈ρe
µe′ ∀e ∈ E (15)
ze ≥ ye − x¯e ∀e ∈ E (16)
pie ∈ {0, 1} ∀e ∈ E (17)
ye ≥ 0; ze ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E (18)
Observation 1 The integrality constraints (17) can be relaxed to 0 ≤ pie ≤ 1, without com-
promising the feasibility or optimality of the optimization problem (11)-(18).
Proof: As µ variables are binary, constraints (15) enforce that the value of pie is set to 0 if none
of the edges in set ρe is attacked. On the other hand, if some of the edges in set ρe are attacked,
then the excessive flow of those edges might be rerouted through edge e and therefore, the actual
flow through edge e can take any value between x¯e and Ue. As pie is used by constraints (14) to
only enforce an upper bound on the flow variable ye, even with continuous relaxation, pie will
take a value of 1 to maximize the inner objective of expression (11). 
Unfortunately, the adversary’s optimization model cannot be solved directly as a linear pro-
gram due to the minimax function in objective (11). However, as all the variables of the inner
maximization problem are continuous, we can convert the entire problem into a minimization
problem by taking dual of the inner problem. To compute the dual, we first obtain the La-
grangian function, L by relaxing constraints (12)-(17) using price variables α, β, γ, δ, ω and η,
respectively.
L(α, β, γ, δ, η, ω) =− y(t,s) +
∑
e∈E
peze +
∑
v∈N\s
αv
[∑
e∈δ−v
ye −
∑
e∈δ+v
ye
]
+
∑
e
δe
[
pie −
∑
e′∈ρe
µe′
]
+
∑
e∈E
γe
[
ye − x¯e − pie(Ue − x¯e)
]
+
∑
e
ηe
[
pie − 1
]
+
∑
e
ωe
[
ye − ze − x¯e
]
+
∑
e∈E
βe
[
ye − Ue + µe(Ue −me)
]
(19)
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We can now write the optimization problem for the adversary by using the dual problem
from the Lagrangian function L. Specifically, we set µ as variable in the dual problem and
incorporate the domain constraints (24) of µ to represent the optimization problem of the ad-
versary. The optimization problem, which is quadratic nature, is compactly shown in Table 1.
min
α,β,γ,δ,η,ω,µ
∑
e
βeUe −
∑
e
βeµe(Ue −me) +
∑
e
γex¯e +
∑
e
δe
∑
e′∈ρe
µe′ +
∑
e
ηe +
∑
e
ωex¯e
(20)
s.t. βe + γe + ωe + αv − αw ≥ 0 ∀e = (v, w) (21)
δe + ηe − γe(Ue − x¯e) ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E (22)
ωe ≤ pe ∀e ∈ E (23)∑
e
µe ≤ Γ (24)
αt = 1;αs = 0 (25)
αv, βe, γe, δe, ηe, ωe ≥ 0;µe ∈ {0, 1} (26)
Table 1: ADVERSARYPROBLEM(G,U,p,x,Γ)
The objective function (20) computes a point-wise minimum of linear functions of µ and
therefore, concave in µ (see Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004). So, the optimization problem
delineated in Table 1 is a concave quadratic program. As a concave function over a compact
domain achieves the optimal solution at an extreme point of the feasible region, we can relax the
binary variables µ to continuous ones (see e.g., the proof of Lemma 6 of Bertsimas et al. 2013).
However, if µ variables are binary, then the bilinear terms in the objective function (20) can be
represented as explicit implication constraints and these constraints are efficiently implemented
by existing mixed-integer optimization solvers like CPLEX or Gurobi.
4.2 Optimization Problem for the Administrator
The administrator’s goal is to identify a robust flow strategy that maximizes the objective value
in the worst-case attacking scenario as indicated in problem (10). However, as the strategy
space of the adversary can be significantly large, we use an incremental approach and consider
the attacking scenarios revealed by the adversary in previous iterations. In the last iteration of
the game, as the adversary repeats her previous attacks as the best response, the administrator at
this point has already generated a robust flow strategy against these worst-case attacks without
considering the entire large strategy space of the adversary.
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max λ (29)
s.t. λ ≤ yˆk(t,s) −
∑
e
pe
[
xˆe + zˆ
k
e
] ∀k ∈ K (30)
zˆke ≥ yˆke − xˆe ∀k ∈ K, e ∈ E (31)∑
e∈δ+v
xˆe −
∑
e∈δ−v
xˆe = 0 ∀v ∈ V \ s (32)
xˆe ≤ Ue ∀e ∈ E (33)∑
e∈δ+v
yˆke −
∑
e∈δ−v
yˆke ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K, v ∈ V \ s (34)
yˆke ≤ (1− µke)Ue + µke ·me ∀k ∈ K, e ∈ E (35)
yˆke ≤ (1− pˆike )xˆe + pˆike · Ue ∀k ∈ K, e ∈ E (36)
λ ≥ 0; xˆe ≥ 0; yˆke ≥ 0 (37)
Table 2: ADMINISTRATORPROBLEM(G,U,p,µ)
Given a set of K attacking scenarios revealed by the adversary in previous K iterations,
the administrator generates a flow strategy that maximizes the minimum amount of traffic flow
reaching the destination overK attacking scenarios. Let µk denote the attacking scenario k and
xˆ denote the robust flow strategy against all the K attacking scenarios. Even though the initial
flow decision xˆ is chosen, it may lead to different outcomes under different attacking scenarios
and the actual amount of flow that reaches the destination will vary depending on the attacking
scenario. So, we introduce yˆk variables to represent the actual flow and zˆk variables to denote
the additional rerouted flow passing through the edges under the attacking scenario k.
As indicated in expression (3), the reward of the administrator is computed as the difference
between the actual flow pushed to the destination and the accumulated cost for routing the initial
flow and the rerouted flow. Therefore, the objective of the administrator is stated as follows:
max
k
min yˆk(t,s) −
∑
e
pe
[
xˆe + zˆ
k
e
]
(27)
The objective function (27) can easily be linearized using expression (28), where we maximize
the proxy variable λ that represents the worst-case objective value over K attacking scenarios.
max λ
s.t. λ ≤ yˆk(t,s) −
∑
e
pe
[
xˆe + zˆ
k
e
] ∀k ∈ K (28)
We show the entire linear optimization problem for the administrator compactly in Table 2.
Constraints (31) ensure that the amount of flow being rerouted through edge e for attacking
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scenario k, zˆke is equivalent to max(0, yˆ
k
e − xˆe). Constraints (32)-(33) enforce the flow preser-
vation and capacity constraints on the flow variables xˆ. Constraints (34)-(35) assure the flow
preservation and capacity constraints on the flow variables yˆk for attacking scenario k. pˆike is a
given input which is set to 0 if none of the edges in edge set ρe (from which the flow can be
rerouted to edge e) is attacked under attacking scenario k and otherwise, it is fixed to 1:
pˆike = min(1,
∑
e′∈ρe
µke′) ∀k ∈ K, e ∈ E (38)
Therefore, constraints (36) enforce that the actual flow going through edge e under attacking
scenario k is bounded by the initial flow xˆe if none of the edges in set ρe is attacked and
otherwise, the upper bound is set to the capacity of the edge, Ue.
4.3 Overall Solution Approach
In this section, we put together the optimization problems delineated in §4.1 and §4.2. To better
understand the overall framework of our proposed solution approach for solving the TNFG,
we explain the key iterative steps in Algorithm (1). We essentially formulate it as a leader-
follower game where the administrator is the leader and the adversary is the follower. In that
sense, the adversary is more powerful and can take decisions after observing the decision of the
administrator. As a result, the administrator needs to take robust decisions by considering all
possible attacking behaviors of the adversary.
Let X and µ store all the previously generated flow and attacking scenarios respectively,
and both are initialized as empty set. µold keeps track of the attacking scenario from the last
iteration and it is initialized to no attacking scenario. Let V L and V U denote the lower and
upper bound of the game which are initialized to 0 and∞, respectively. In each iteration of the
game, the administrator solves the optimization problem from Table 2 to compute the optimal
robust flow strategy against the previously generated attacking scenario pool µ. Note that the
administrators optimization problem from Table 2 can have multiple optimal solutions. For
example, in the first iteration, the administrator essentially solves a max flow min cost problem
which can have multiple flow solutions with optimal objective value. Let, x˜ denote the set of
optimal robust flow solutions computed by the administrator in the current iteration. We also
update the upper bound of the game V U to the objective value of the administrator. From these
flow solutions, we identify the flows, xc which are not executed before. If all the solutions of x˜
are executed before, then the process terminates as any solution from x˜ is a robust flow against
any possible attack from Ψ. Otherwise, we randomly pick one flow x∗ from xc and execute it.
We also add this new flow x∗ into the pool of flow solutionsX .
Once the administrator generates a flow x∗ and executes it, the adversary computes the best
attacking scenario µ˜ to optimally disrupt the flow x∗ by solving the optimization model from
Table 1. In addition, the lower bound of the game V L is updated to the adversary’s objective
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Algorithm 1: SOLVETNFG(G,U,p,Γ)
1 Initialize: X ← {},µ← {}, µold ← 0, V L ← 0, V U ←∞ ;
2 while (V U 6= V L) do
3 x˜, V U ← ADMINSTRATORPROBLEM(G,U,p,µ) ; . Robust flow solutions against
µ
4 xp ← x˜ ∩X ; . xp contains previously executed flows
5 xc ← x˜ \ xp ; . xc contains flows which are not executed yet
6 if |xc| = 0 then
7 break ; . Process converges
8 else
9 x∗ ← Random(xc) ; . Randomly pick one flow from xc and execute it
10 X ←X ∪ x∗ ; . Add flow x∗ into flow strategy pool X
11 µ˜, V L ← ADVERSARYPROBLEM(G,U,p, x∗,Γ) ; . Generate best attack against x∗
12 if µ˜ 6= µold then
13 µ← µ ∪ µ˜ ; . Adversary executes µ˜ and add it to attacking solution pool µ
14 µold ← µ˜ ; . Update the old attacking scenario
15 else
16 break ; . Process converges
17 return x˜,µ
value. If the adversary does not repeat the attacking scenario from previous iteration (i.e.,
µold), then we add the new attacking scenario µ˜ into the attacking scenario pool µ and update
µold to the new attacking scenario µ˜. On the contrary, if the adversary repeats the same attack
from previous iteration, then the process converges as x∗ is the robust flow scenario against µ˜.
Specifically, the objective values of both the players would converge at this point and we can
guarantee that if the administrator executes the flow x∗, then the lower bound on her objective
value would be the value at which the objectives of the players converged. It should be noted
that as the administrator’s optimization problem can have uncountable number of solutions
with optimal objective value, a situation might arise where although the objectives of both the
players converge, they can come up with new strategies in subsequent iterations that lead to
same objective value. To avoid such situation, we terminate the process if the lower and upper
bound of the game converges. On the other hand, if the optimization problems of the players are
solved sub-optimally (e.g., see §6 for large-scale problems), then the lower and upper bound of
the game might not converge even though the players start repeating their previous strategies.
To tackle these situations, we enforce both the termination conditions in Algorithm 1.
Proposition 1 The proposed iterative game converges to a maximin equilibrium and produces
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a robust maximum flow strategy for the administrator.
Proof. As the adversary has a finite number of attacking scenarios (i.e., |Ψ| = (|E|
Γ
)
), the pro-
posed iterative game is guaranteed to converge. We begin the proof by showing that if the play-
ers start repeating their previous strategies and their respective decision problems are solved
optimally, then the lower and upper bound of the game would converge. Let us suppose the
game converges after K iterations and the set of K − 1 attacking scenarios computed by the
adversary in previous iterations is denoted by µ. Let x˜ represent the flow strategy of the admin-
istrator and µ˜ ∈ µ denote the attacking scenario of the adversary in the last iteration. As the
adversary repeats one of her previous attacks in the final iteration, the objective of the adver-
sary for the final iteration, V L = M(x˜, µ˜) = minµ∈µM(x˜, µ), where M(x˜, µ˜) represents the
adaptive value of the flow x˜ under attacking scenario µ˜ which can be computed using the LO
model (3)-(8). Similarly, as the administrator maximizes the minimum adaptive flow value over
all the attacks in µ, the objective value for the final iteration is V U = minµ∈µM(x˜, µ) = V L.
Let V L = V U = V . From the adversary’s optimized solution, since ∀µ ∈ Ψ,M(x˜, µ) ≥
V , we know minµ∈ΨM(x˜, µ) ≥ V . On the other hand, from the administrator’s optimized
solution, since ∀x ∈ X ,minµ∈µM(x, µ) ≤ V , we know x ∈ X ,minµ∈Ψ M(x, µ) ≤ V .
By combining these two inequalities, we have ∀x ∈ X ,minµ∈ΨM(x˜, µ) ≥ minµ∈ΨM(x, µ),
which concludes the proof that the administrator’s final flow strategy x˜ is maximin optimal. 
If Algorithm 1 ends up considering all the attacking scenarios (i.e., K = |Ψ|), then the
proposed iterative approach will be slower than solving the original problem of identifying a
flow strategy that maximizes the minimum adaptive flow value by considering all the attacking
scenarios in Ψ. However, it is reasonable to expect that only some attacking choices are better
to execute in practice than others. For example, if all the incoming edges to a node is attacked,
then none of the outgoing edges from that node will be selected, or if the edge with maximum
capacity in a source to destination path is attacked, then other edges in that path are less likely to
be attacked. Our proposed approach provides a principle way to identify those crucial attacking
scenarios. In fact, for all the problem instances in our experiment, we observe that the proposed
iterative game converges within 20 iterations.
5 Experimental Results on Small-scale Data Sets
To evaluate the performance of our two-player iterative game approach2, we create a set of syn-
thetic networks. We show the performance analysis by varying three tunable input parameters:
(a) Number of nodes; (b) The edge density which controls the number of edges; and (c) Budget
(i.e., maximum number of edges that can be attacked) of the adversary, Γ. Finally, we show the
2All the linear optimization models are solved using IBM ILOG CPLEX optimization Studio V12.7.1 on a 3.4
GHz Intel Core i7 machine with 16GB DDR3 RAM.
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runtime performance of our approach for all the instances. We consider two key performance
metrics for comparison:
1. Lost flow – The difference between the flow sent from the source node and the amount
of flow reached to the terminal node; and
2. Objective – The objective value for the administrator, which we want to maximize, is
computed as the difference between the amount of flow pushed to the terminal node and
the total cost of routing and rerouting the flow through the network.
We compare the performance of our approach against the following four well-known state-
of-the-art benchmark approaches:
1. Max-Flow solution (MF): In this approach, we assume that the administrator is not aware
of any attacks and sends the optimal (i.e., Max-Flow solution) flow through the network.
2. One step planning (OSP): This is a one-stage game model where the administrator first
computes a Max-Flow solution, then the adversary identifies an optimal attack to disrupt
the Max-Flow solution and finally, the administrator finds an optimal flow solution for
the network which is damaged according to the attacking scenario revealed by the ad-
versary. This one-stage game model is applicable to the settings where the administrator
takes a myopic view and assumes that the attacker cannot observe the flow sent by the
administrator. Therefore, from the administrator’s perspective, the best policy for the ad-
versary is to attack the initial Max-Flow solution which can be computed if the network
structure and edge capacities are known to her.
3. Robust flow solution (RF): For this approach, we compute a robust flow solution where
the entire flow of an attacked edge is assumed to be lost. Bertsimas et al. (2013) propose
an optimization model for computing a robust flow solution by assuming that a maximum
of Γv incoming edges to node v can fail. We modify the optimization model to ensure
that a maximum of Γ edges in the network can be attacked. The details of the modified
optimization model is provided in Appendix A.
4. Approximate adaptive maximum flow solution (AAMF): For this approach, our goal is
to compute an adaptive maximum flow solution where the flow can be adjusted after the
edge failure occurred. We adopt an optimization model from Bertsimas et al. (2013)
which provides an approximate solution to the adaptive maximum flow problem. The
details of this approach is provided in Appendix B.
Finally, we refer to our iterative game approach as robust and adaptive maximum flow
(RAMF) solution. To ensure fairness in comparison, we assume that the adversary always acts
as a follower and optimally disrupts the resulting flow solution for all the five approaches.
20
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis by Varying the Number of Nodes
We compare our approach against the benchmark approaches by varying the number of nodes
in the network. Figure 2 demonstrates the comparison results, where we vary the number of
nodes in the X-axis. The edge density for all the randomly generated directed graphs is fixed to
0.4 and the adversary budget is set to 5. The capacities of the edges are randomly drawn from
the range of 1 to 20 and the unit edge costs for routing flows, p are generated randomly from
the range of 0.01 to 0.1. For each problem category with a fixed number of nodes, we create
5 problem instances and report the average statistic over all the 5 instances. Figure 2(a) shows
the net amount of lost flow due to attacks. As expected, the amount of lost flow is significantly
high for the MF approach, as it ignores the adversary’s attacking behavior. The number of
lost flow for RF and AAMF is also significantly higher than our RAMF approach. The OSP
approach is more conservative and therefore, the lost flow for the OSP is always lower than
other benchmarks. The lost flow for our RAMF approach is almost always lower than all the
four benchmarks.
Figure 2(b) delineates the percentage gain in the objective value of the administrator in a
logarithmic scale. Let Umax denote the maximum capacity of an edge (i.e., Umax = maxe Ue)3.
Then, the maximum loss in the objective value due to adversarial attacks in bounded by (Umax×
Γ), where Γ is the budget for the adversary. So, the gain of our approach against a benchmark
approach (e.g., MF) is computed as the ratio between the difference in objectives and the upper
bound on the marginal gain.
%Gain over MF =
(Obj of RAMF - Obj of MF)×100
Umax × Γ (39)
As shown in Figure 2(b), our approach always outperforms all the four benchmark ap-
proaches. The average percentage gains in the objective value for our approach over MF, OSP,
RF and AAMF are 4.8%, 25.4%, 6.3% and 4.2%, respectively.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis by Varying the Number of Edges
We now demonstrate a sensitivity analysis by varying the number of edges in the network.
Figure 3 presents the comparison results, where we vary the edge density from 0.4 to 0.8 in
the X-axis. For these experiments, we consider a network with 20 nodes and the adversary
budget is set to 5. We create 5 random instances for each of the settings and report the average
statistic. Figure 3(a) shows the net amount of lost flow for all the approaches. We observe a
consistent pattern that the lost flows for the MF, RF, AAMF approaches are at least two times
higher than our approach in all the cases. While the lost flow for the OSP approach is almost
3As the capacities are drawn randomly from the range of 1 to 20, we set the value of Umax to 20.
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Figure 2: Effect of number of nodes on (a) Lost flow; (b) Objective.
similar for edge density 0.4 to 0.6, our RAMF approach performs better when the number of
edges increases.
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Figure 3: Effect of number of edges on (a) Lost flow; (b) Objective.
Figure 3(b) delineates the percentage gain in the objective value in a logarithmic scale. The
gap between objectives and the gain for our approach remain consistent in all the settings. As
expected, AAMF always outperforms RF approach due to the flow adjustment. The percentage
gains in the objective value for our approach against all the benchmark approaches are always
positive. On an average, the percentage gains in objective for our approach over the MF, OSP,
RF and AAMF approaches are 6%, 31.8%, 8.1% and 5.4%, respectively.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis by Varying the Adversary’s Budget
In this thread of results, we present the effect of adversary’s budget on both the performance
metrics. Figure 4 demonstrates the comparison results, where we vary the adversary’s budget
from 1 to 10 in the X-axis. For these experiments, we generate five random instances of net-
works with 20 nodes and edge density 0.8. Figure 4(a) exhibits net amount of lost flow for all
the approaches. The amount of lost flow for MF approach increases monotonically from 20
to 150 as we increase the adversary’s budget, whereas the lost flow for the RAMF approach is
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always bounded by 40. Moreover, we observe that the number of lost flow for our RAMF ap-
proach remains consistent when the value of Γ goes beyond 7. Such sensitivity analysis results
can be used for initial estimation of the adversary’s budget value.
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Figure 4: Effect of adversary’s budget on (a) Lost flow; (b) Objective.
Figure 4(b) demonstrates the percentage gains in the objective value for our approach over
all the benchmarks in a logarithmic scale. As the upper bound on marginal gain (i.e., Umax×Γ)
increases with adversary’s budget, the percentage gain in objective over the OSP, RF and AAMF
approaches reduces monotonically with the value of Γ. Although the gain of our approach over
the MF approach remains consistent for different values Γ, the net difference between the ob-
jectives increases monotonically. Therefore, these results clearly indicate that the performance
of our approach improves gradually if the adversary becomes stronger.
In a nutshell, we observe that the RAMF approach reduces the lost flow significantly over
MF, RF and AAMF approaches. On the other hand, the percentage gains in the objective value
for the RAMF approach over all the benchmarks are always positive and the gain is significantly
high over the OSP approach. Therefore, we can conclude that among five approaches, only our
RAMF approach is able to maintain the right trade-off between the two performance metrics.
5.4 Convergence Results
Figure 5(a) shows the convergence of our proposed iterative game on a problem with 35 nodes
and edge density 0.4 where the adversary’s budget is set to 5. The X-axis represents the iteration
number of the game and the Y-axis denotes the objective value obtained by the players. As
expected, the objective for the administrator reduces monotonically over the iterations. As the
administrator generates more conservative solution over the iterations, the adversary’s ability
to disrupt the flow strategy reduces. The objectives converge to 349 after 15 iterations. So,
we can claim that the administrator’s objective will at least be 349 (for any attacking scenario
from Ψ) if the resulting robust flow strategy is adopted. Figure 5(b) delineates objectives of the
players in each iteration of the game on another problem instance with 20 node, edge density
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0.8 and adversary’s budget as 10, which converges after 14 iterations. For all the other problem
instances in our experiment, we observe that the game converges within 20 iterations.
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Figure 5: Convergence of the proposed iterative game on problems with (a) 35 nodes; and (b) Γ=10.
5.5 Runtime Performance
As all the benchmark approaches provide solution from single-step optimization model, the
runtimes for them are always lower than our iterative RAMF approach. Therefore, in this thread
of results, we only demonstrate the runtime performance of our RAMF approach for different
settings of network and adversary’s budget. Figure 6 presents the runtime for the RAMF in
seconds in a logarithmic scale. As shown clearly, the runtime increases monotonically as the
size of the network (in terms of both the number of nodes and edges) increases. Furthermore,
as expected, the quadratic optimization problem for the adversary from Table 1 becomes more
computationally expensive as we increase the value of Γ and therefore, the runtime increases
monotonically as the adversary becomes stronger. As the computational complexity of our
approach increases gradually with all the three input tunable parameters, we only show the
performance on small-scale problems in this section.
5.6 Results on SNDlib Data Set
In this section, we provide comparison results of our RAMF approach against four benchmarks
on instances from the Survivable Network Design Library [SNDLib] (Orlowski et al. 2010).
SNDLib database consists of 26 problem instances. The capacities of edges, U are directly
adopted from the database4. The unit edge costs for routing flows, p are randomly drawn from
the range of 0.01 to 0.1. In the default settings of our experiments, we set the adversary’s
budget to 5. However, due to small number of edges in some instances, we observe that the
4For some instances, the capacities for all the edges are stated as 0 in the SNDlib database. For those instances,
we set the capacities to a randomly drawn value between 500 to 1000.
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Figure 6: Runtime results for varying number of nodes, edges and adversary’s budget.
flow reaching the terminal node is always 0 for all the approaches, if we allow the adversary to
manipulate 5 edges. So, we reduce the adversary’s budget accordingly for those instances.
Table 3 elaborates the comparison results on all the 26 instances of SNDlib data set. For
each instance, we show the network details (i.e., the number of nodes and edges, and the adver-
sary’s budget), the amount of lost flow for all the five approaches and the runtime for our RAMF
approach. We also provide the percentage gains in objective value for our approach over the
four benchmarks, which are computed using the maximum capacity and the adversary’s budget
value. For all the instances, the amount of lost flow for the MF approach is significantly higher
than the RAMF approach. The percentage gains in objective of the RAMF approach against
the four benchmarks are always positive. On an average, our approach improves the objective
value by 4.8%, 43.7%, 7.9% and 4.9% over MF, OSP, RF and AAMF, respectively. In addition,
we observe that our approach is computationally attractive for these structured benchmark net-
works. The runtime for our approach is always bounded by 90 seconds except for two instances
(i.e., ‘giul39’ and ‘janos-us-ca’) for which the edge capacities are generated randomly as they
are stated as 0 in the SNDlib database.
6 Heuristics for Large-scale Networks
As indicated in §5.5, the runtime complexity of our RAMF approach increases with the network
size and adversary’s budget value. The key reason behind this behavior is that we need to solve a
complex quadratic program from Table 1 for the adversary’s decision problem in each iteration
of the game. The adversary’s decision problem seeks to identify Γ best edges to attack so as
to minimize the resulting objective of the administrator for a given flow strategy. In case of
“s-t planar graphs”, this problem can be solved in polynomial time (Wollmer 1964) if the entire
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Problem Instance Number of Lost Flow
%Gain in Objective
of RAMF over
Runtime
(sec)
Name |V| |E| Γ MF OSP RF AAMF RAMF MF OSP RF AAMF RAMF
abilene 14 22 2 1828 1602 1796 1692 1602 2.2 65.4 1.9 0.9 0.2
atlanta 17 31 3 28711 5000 12000 12000 7966 3.9 5.8 1.8 1.3 3.6
brain 163 399 5 4512 4142 4512 4220 4142 1.3 67.6 9.7 2.9 65.7
cost266 39 80 5 4507 3545 4314 4050 3859 2.9 55.5 2.2 2.4 11.0
dfn-bwin 12 50 5 3657 1155 3626 3060 118 8.4 19.8 10.2 8.5 2.6
dfn-gwin 13 54 5 3013 1361 2750 2795 979 8.8 37.7 10 8.4 2.0
di-yuan 13 49 5 4653 1869 4377 3850 1803 9.7 33.2 9.7 7.1 1.2
france 27 60 5 4502 2912 4236 4340 3755 2.5 42.7 2.5 3.1 1.3
geant 24 48 5 4633 3840 4467 4435 3984 1.8 64.3 3.5 2.7 2.3
germany50 52 109 5 4338 3989 4148 4130 4046 2.9 66.1 8.6 6.7 6.6
giul39 41 189 5 4710 1488 4447 4190 2118 10.5 24.3 33.7 13.0 3183
india35 37 97 5 4489 3421 4290 4195 3737 2.4 57.1 5.5 4.1 5.4
janos-us-
ca
41 139 5 4647 3093 4219 4310 3100 9.3 44.7 16.1 14.7 2443
janos-us 28 97 5 3891 1784 3205 3205 3057 3.7 26.1 9.8 3.4 7.8
newyork 18 58 5 4700 3106 4607 4470 3604 3.9 46.5 3.3 4.1 4.1
nobel-eu 30 55 5 4403 3367 4020 3690 3582 3.9 52.4 2.7 1.5 0.8
nobel-
germany
19 39 5 4691 2612 4400 4400 3441 2.6 39.3 1.5 1.5 1.8
nobel-us 16 33 5 4828 3293 4726 4665 4621 0.8 50.9 0.5 0.3 1.3
norway 29 64 5 4100 2321 3817 3215 3028 4.2 37.6 7.7 1.9 5.6
pdh 13 41 5 4283 1422 4039 3645 2062 8.6 21.0 9.5 8.9 0.8
pioro40 42 106 5 4283 1422 4039 3645 2062 1.5 57.2 6.4 2.2 15.1
polska 14 26 3 2695 1908 2672 2460 1837 3.9 54.1 7.1 6.7 0.3
sun 29 115 5 4552 2918 4324 3930 3692 4.0 45.3 17.6 5.8 53.2
ta1 26 66 5 4552 2918 4324 3930 3692 10.6 33.9 14.5 11.7 80.7
ta2 67 138 5 38464 15776 25200 15120 14023 9.3 17.1 5.4 1.3 8.0
zib54 56 108 5 4786 4378 4671 4523 4483 1.3 70.3 3.5 2.9 11.7
Table 3: Empirical results on SNDlib data set.
flow of an attacked edge is assumed to be lost. However, if the flow of an attacked edge is
allowed to reroute through other paths, then the resulting flow at an edge after attack is not
upper bounded by the initial flow value and therefore, the existing polynomial time algorithms
cannot be employed to solve our problem. However, for a given attacking scenario, we can
precompute the set of edges through which the additional flow might be rerouted and compute
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an upper bound on the resulting flow assigned to the edges. Therefore, the utility of a given
attack can be computed by solving a min cost max flow problem (in polynomial time) on a
network whose edge capacities are set to the upper bounds. However, to compute an optimal
attacking scenario, we need to solve such polynomial time algorithms for
(|E|
Γ
)
times using an
exhaustive search which is practically intractable for large networks.
In this section, we provide two novel heuristic approaches to efficiently solve the complex
optimization problem of the adversary. The first heuristic is developed using an accelerated
greedy approach and the second heuristic is a network partitioning based optimization ap-
proach. We now describe the details of the two heuristic approaches for solving the adversary’s
decision problem.
6.1 Greedy Approach
The greedy approach incrementally identifies the set of edges to be attacked by the adversary
so as to disrupt the network for a given flow strategy. We begin with an alternative formulation
of the optimization model (3)-(8) to evaluate the utility of an attacking scenario µ for a given
flow scenario x¯. The alternative linear optimization (LO) model is compactly shown in Table 4.
The objective is to route maximum amount of flow to the terminal node while minimizing the
total amount of rerouting cost. First two sets of constraints enforce the flow preservation and
capacity constraints. The value of pi is computed using equation (38) and is given as an input
to the LO model. So, the third set of constraints ensure that if an edge e does not belong to any
of the rerouted paths from the attacked edges, then the flow through the edge is bounded by the
given flow value x¯e. The last set of constraints compute the amount of rerouted flow ze through
the edge e. It should be noted that the solution of the LO model can be obtained in polynomial
time by solving a min cost max flow problem on a modified network where the capacity of an
edge e is set to 0 if µe = 1, x¯e if pie = 0 and otherwise it remains Ue.
max y(t,s) −
∑
e∈E
pe · ze
s.t.
∑
e∈δ+v
ye −
∑
e∈δ−v
ye ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V \ s
ye ≤ (1− µe)Ue + µeme ∀e ∈ E
ye ≤ (1− pie)x¯e + pie · Ue ∀e ∈ E
ze ≥ ye − x¯e ∀e ∈ E
Table 4: IDENTIFYFLOW(G,U,p, x¯, µ)
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Algorithm (2) provides the details of the greedy algorithm. We start with an empty attacked
edge set µ. Let E denote an edge set that initially contains all the edges. We first compute the
objective value O for the given administrator’s flow strategy x¯ without executing any attacks
in the network. In each iteration, we calculate the utility ge for adding an edge e ∈ E in
the current attack set µ by employing the LO model from Table 4 and compute the marginal
gain in the adversary’s objective for attacking the edge e. Then we add the best edge e∗ (that
provides maximum marginal gain) into µ and remove it from potential edge setE. This process
continues until the budget for the adversary is exhausted.
Algorithm 2: GREEDY(G =< V , E >,U,p, x¯,Γ)
1 Initialize: µ← {}; it← 0;E ← E ;
2 O ← IDENTIFYFLOW(G,U,p, x¯, µ) ; . Compute objective for the given flow x¯
3 repeat
4 it← it+ 1 ;
5 ge, xˆ← IDENTIFYFLOW(G,U,p, x¯, µ ∪ {e}) ∀e ∈ E;
6 ge ← O − ge ∀e ∈ E ; . Compute marginal gain for edge e
7 e∗ ← arg max
e∈E
ge ; . Choose edge e∗ with highest marginal gain
8 O ← O + ge∗ ; . Update objective value for current attack µ
9 µ← µ ∪ {e∗} ; . Update current attacking scenario µ
10 E ← E − {e∗} ; . Update potential edge set E
11 until (|µ| ≥ Γ);
12 return µ
Although the LO model from Table 4 can be solved in polynomial time, the greedy approach
needs to solve it (Γ×|E|) times and therefore, it is not suitable for problems with large number
of edges. In case of sub-modular objective function, lazy greedy algorithms (Minoux 1978)
can be employed to accelerate the solution process. However, the following two examples
show that the adversary’s decision problem is neither sub-modular nor super-modular.
Example 6.1 The adversary’s decision problem is not sub-modular: A function is monotone
sub-modular if the marginal gain for adding an element into the subset is always higher than
adding the same element into its superset. Figure 7(a) illustrates that the adversary’s decision
problem does not exhibit this property. The network has 8 nodes and 11 edges and the pair
of numbers in each edge represents the flow and capacity of the corresponding edge. Let us
assume that the unit cost for routing the flow is 0 for all the edges. If we add the edge e37 in the
attacked edge set which only contains edge e26, the marginal gain in objective remains 0 as the
entire flow can be rerouted through the augmented path {e36, e68}. In contrast, if we add the
edge e37 in the superset which contains e26 and e45, then the marginal gain in objective is 2, as
the residual capacity of e68 is now shared by the rerouted flow from both e37 and e45. As the
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marginal gain for adding edge e37 into superset is higher, the adversary’s decision problem is
not sub-modular.
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Figure 7: Adversary’s decision problem is (a) neither sub-modular; (b) nor super-modular.
Example 6.2 The adversary’s decision problem is not super-modular: A function is referred
as monotone super-modular if the marginal gain for adding an element into the subset is al-
ways lower than adding the same element into its superset. Figure 7(b) illustrates that the
adversary’s decision problem is not super-modular. We employ the same network with 8 nodes
and 11 edges. In this example, if we add the edge e37 in the attacked edge set as the first el-
ement, then the entire flow is lost and therefore, the gain in the adversary’s objective is 3. In
contrast, if we add the edge e37 in the superset which contains edge e26, the entire flow can be
rerouted to the terminal node and the marginal gain in objective is 0. Hence, the adversary’s
decision problem is clearly not super-modular, as the marginal gain for adding edge e37 into
superset is lower.
Even though the adversary’s decision problem is neither sub-modular nor super-modular,
the following observation shows that the upper bound on the marginal gain for attacking an edge
can be precomputed which provides us the basis to develop an accelerated greedy algorithm.
Observation 2 The maximum amount of lost flow for attacking an edge e is bounded by the
flow assigned to that edge, x¯e if the adversary’s budget is 1 (i.e., Γ = 1).
As we incrementally elect one edge at a time for the greedy approach, we exploit the Ob-
servation (2) to develop an accelerated greedy algorithm which is shown in Algorithm (3). Let
E denote the set of candidate edges and µ be the set of attacked edges which is initialized as
an empty set. We first compute the objective value g0 for the given flow strategy x¯ without
considering any attacks. In each iteration, we keep an upper bound Be on the marginal gain for
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edge e which is initialized to the given flow value x¯e. We also introduce a set Eˆ (initialized as
an empty set) that stores the edges for which the marginal gain has already been computed in
the current iteration. We iteratively select the edge e∗ with maximum upper bound and add it
to the edge set Eˆ. Then we employ the LO model from Table 4 to compute the objective value
and marginal gain for adding the edge e∗ in the current attacking set µ and update the upper
bound Be∗ with the marginal gain value. In addition, as the flow values for the edges change
due to modified attacks, we store the updated flow strategy xˆ. If the marginal gain for edge e∗
is equal or greater than the upper bound for all the unexplored edges (i.e., e ∈ E \ Eˆ), then
the best edge for the current iteration is identified. We then select the edge e∗∗ with highest
marginal gain, insert it to the set of attacked edges µ and remove it from the candidate edge set
E. Finally, we update the flow strategy x¯ with the modified flow strategy xˆ. Therefore, in each
iteration, the accelerated greedy algorithm is able to identify the best edge without executing
the LO model for |E \ Eˆ| times in comparison to the greedy algorithm, which significantly re-
duces the runtime. This iterative edge selection process continues until the adversary’s budget
is exhausted.
Algorithm 3: ACCELERATEDGREEDY(G =< V , E >,U,p, x¯,Γ)
1 Initialize: µ← {}; it← 0;E ← E ;
2 g0, xˆ← IDENTIFYFLOW(G,U,p, x¯, µ) ; . Compute objective for the given flow x¯
3 repeat
4 it← it+ 1 ;
5 Be ← x¯e∀e ∈ E ; . Update upper bounds with the new flow x¯ from last iteration
6 Eˆ ← {} ;
7 repeat
8 e∗ ← arg max
e∈E
Be ; . Choose the edge e∗ with highest upper bound
9 Eˆ ← Eˆ ∪ {e∗} ; . Update the list of visited edges
10 git, xˆ← IDENTIFYFLOW(G,U,p, x¯, µ ∪ {e∗});
11 Be∗ ← git−1 − git ; . Update the upper bound for edge e∗
12 if Be∗ ≥ Be, ∀e ∈ E \ Eˆ then
13 e∗∗ ← arg max
e∈Eˆ
Be ; . Choose the edge e∗∗ with highest marginal gain
14 µ← µ ∪ {e∗∗} ; . Update the current attacking edge set
15 E ← E − {e∗∗} ; . Update the candidate edge set E
16 x¯← xˆ ; . Update the flow scenario x¯ according to new attack µ
17 Break;
18 until True;
19 until (|µ| ≥ Γ);
20 return µ
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6.2 Network Partitioning Based Optimization
As indicated in §5.5, the complexity of the adversary’s decision problem grows exponentially
with the number of edges in the network. So, for our second heuristic, we first identify a small
subset of candidate edges that are highly likely to be present in an optimal solution and then
the adversary’s optimization problem from Table 1 is solved by only considering the small set
of candidate edges. To identify the candidate edges, we propose a network partitioning based
iterative approach. In each iteration, the network is partitioned into disjoint sub-networks and
those sub-problems are solved independently to elect Γ best edges to attack.
We begin the discussion with a random network partitioning approach that is compactly
shown in Algorithm (4). Let, we have a network with N(= |V|) nodes. We first randomly
sample (N
2
− 1) nodes that excludes the source and terminal node5. All the randomly sampled
nodes along with the source node are kept in the first sub-network and the remaining nodes
are kept in the second sub-network. In addition, an artificial terminal node tˆ for first sub-
network and an artificial source node sˆ for the second sub-network are created. For each edge
e(= {u, v}) in the network, we carry out the following operations:
• If both u and v lie in the first sub-network, we create a directed edge between them.
• If both u and v lie in the second sub-network, we create a directed edge between them.
• If u lies in first sub-network and v lies in the second sub-network, then we create two
edges, one from node u to node tˆ in the first sub-network and another one from node sˆ
to node v in the second sub-network. The flow and capacity values for both the newly
introduced edges are directly taken from edge e6.
• If u lies in the second sub-network and v lies in first sub-network, then we remove edge
e from the sub-problems.
Example 6.3 Figure (8) illustrates our random network partitioning approach on a small syn-
thetic network. The network has 8 nodes and 16 edges. The numbers associated with each
directed edge represent the corresponding flow and capacity values. The blue colored nodes
represent the chosen nodes for the first sub-network and other nodes are kept in the second
5In case of multiple source nodes, we create an artificial source node and connect it to all the original source
nodes. Similarly, in case multiple terminal nodes, we create an artificial terminal node and connect all the original
terminal nodes to the artificial node. During the network partitioning process, we ensure that all the original source
nodes are kept in the first sub-network and all the original terminal nodes are kept in the second sub-network.
6It should be noted that due to our edge reconstruction, there might be multiple parallel edges from one node
of the first sub-network to the terminal node or from the source node of second sub-network to another node. In
that case, we replace all the parallel edges with same source and destination node with a single edge whose flow
and capacity values are computed as the sum of flows and capacities of all the parallel edges.
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Algorithm 4: NETWORKPARTITIONING(G =< V , E >)
1 Vs ← RANDOMSAMPLE (V \ {s, t}, |V|/2) ; . Randomly sample half of the nodes
2 Vs ← Vs ∪ {s} ∪ {tˆ} ; . Vs represents the set of nodes in the first sub-network
3 V t ← V \ Vs ∪ {sˆ} ; . Vt represents the set of nodes in the second sub-network
4 Es ← {} ; . Es represents the set of edges in the first sub-network
5 E t ← {} ; . Et represents the set of edges in the second sub-network
6 for e = {u, v} ∈ E do
7 if u, v ∈ Vs then
8 Es ← Es ∪ e ; . Add edge e directly if both u and v lie in first sub-network
9 if u, v ∈ V t then
10 E t ← E t ∪ e ; . Add edge e directly if both u and v lie in second sub-network
11 if (u ∈ Vs) ∧ (v ∈ V t) then
12 Es ← Es ∪ {u, tˆ} ; . Create an edge between u and tˆ in first sub-network
13 E t ← E t ∪ {sˆ, v} ; . Create an edge between sˆ and v in second sub-network
14 return Gs =< Vs, Es >,Gt =< V t, E t >
sub-network. We create an artificial terminal node ‘d’ for the first sub-network and an artifi-
cial source node ‘s’ for the second sub-network. Finally, we replace each edge that connects
the two sub-networks with two artificial edges (shown in red color), one sinks to the artifi-
cial terminal node and other one originates from the artificial source node. If multiple edges
share the same source and destination node, we replace them with a single artificial edge with
cumulative flow and capacity values.
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Figure 8: Illustration of partitioning approach.
Algorithm (5) describes the key steps for the network partitioning based heuristic approach.
Let µE denote the set of potential candidate edges, which is initialized as an empty set. In each
iteration, we randomly partition the network into two sub-networks (i.e., Gs, Gt) and solve the
adversary’s decision model for both the sub-networks independently with a budget of Γ
2
for
each sub-problem. Then we insert the resulting attacked edges from both the sub-problems to
the candidate edge set µE . This iterative process continues until a predetermined number of
32
iterations is completed or the cardinality of the candidate edge set reaches a given threshold
value ∆. Finally, we solve the adversary’s optimization problem from Table 1 to identify the
best Γ edges to attack from the candidate edges µE . Specifically, we manually set the value of
µe to 0 if the edge e does not belong to the candidate edge set (i.e., e /∈ µE). This problem is
computationally less expensive as the search space reduces from |E| to |µE |( |E|).
It should be noted that, in case of extensively large networks, even the sub-problems might
become intractable if we partition the network into two sub-networks. In such scenarios, our
approach can be extended to recursively partition the sub-networks into even smaller networks
and then the decision problem can be solved independently for all the small networks to com-
pute the set of candidate edges. In addition, as the network size increases, the value of the
threshold parameter ∆ needs to be reduced accordingly for solving the final decision problem
over the candidate edges.
Algorithm 5: PARTITIONINGHEURISTIC(G =< V , E >,U,p, x¯,Γ)
1 Initialize: µE ← {}; it← 0; . Initialize candidate edge set µE as an empty set
2 repeat
3 it← it+ 1 ;
4 {Gs, Gt} ← NETWORKPARTITIONING(G) ; . Randomly partition the network
5 µs ← ADVERSARYPROBLEM(Gs, U,p, x¯, Γ
2
) ; . Solve first sub-network problem
6 µt ← ADVERSARYPROBLEM(Gt, U,p, x¯, Γ
2
) ; . Solve second sub-network problem
7 µE ← µE ∪ µs ∪ µt ; . Add the new set of potential edges to µE
8 until (|µE | ≥ ∆) ∨ (it ≥M);
9 µ← ADVERSARYPROBLEM({G, µE}, U,p, x¯,Γ) ; . Solve the problem over µE edges
10 return µ
7 Experimental Results on Large-scale Data Sets
In this section, we present empirical results on large-scale problem instances. We use the same
setting used in §5 to generate a set of large synthetic networks. We demonstrate the sensitivity
results by varying three input tunable parameters: (a) the number of nodes, (b) the edge density,
and (c) the adversary’s budget. For all the networks, we randomly draw the capacities for the
edges from the range of 1 to 50. Therefore, the value of maximum capacity Umax is set to 50.
The unit costs for routing the flow through edges (i.e., p) are drawn randomly from the range
of 0.01 to 0.1. We compare our RAMF approach against the four benchmark approaches (i.e.,
MF, OSP, RF and AAMF) that are explained in §5.
For the large-scale problem instances, we employ the heuristics from §6 to efficiently solve
the adversary’s decision problem. In each iteration of the game, both the accelerated greedy
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approach from §6.1 and the network partitioning based heuristic approach from §6.2 are solved.
We begin by showing the performance comparison between the two proposed heuristics. We
empirically observe that the partition based heuristic mostly performs better than the greedy
approach, specially at the later stage of the game. However, as both the approaches pro-
vide sub-optimal solutions, the greedy approach outperforms the partitioning based heuristic
in some cases. To illustrate this behavior, we show the number of lost flows, overall objective
value and runtime for both the heuristics in each iteration of the game on a problem instance
with 50 nodes, 0.4 edge density and the adversary’s budget as 10. As the adversary seeks to
minimize the administrator’s objective value, a better quality solution should provide lower ob-
jective value and higher number of lost flow. As shown in Table 5, while the partitioning based
heuristic mostly outperforms the greedy approach, the solution quality of the greedy approach
is better for a few iterations (e.g., 1, 6 and 7). As the partitioning based heuristic does not al-
ways dominate the greedy approach, we solve the adversary’s decision problem using both the
heuristics in each iteration of the game and choose the attacking scenario that provides a better
solution quality. In terms of the computational complexity, as expected, the greedy approach is
proven to be much faster than the network partitioning based heuristic.
Iteration Lost Flow Objective Value Runtime (Sec)
Greedy Partitioning Greedy Partitioning Difference Greedy Partitioning
1 466 447 1171.99 1190.91 -18.92 2.05 106.68
2 143 213 1071.76 1011.77 59.99 29.92 224.19
3 124 185 1096.4 1040.24 56.16 31.24 132.21
4 135 185 1118.11 1077.06 41.05 30.86 183.59
5 178 197 1117.71 1104.38 13.33 24.18 265.3
6 168 151 1157.89 1181.58 -23.69 25.66 684.01
7 187 182 1152.21 1158.04 -5.83 26.14 505.1
8 135 165 1206.67 1187.68 18.99 31.19 278.07
9 144 173 1201.79 1179.36 22.43 32.65 240.05
10 127 138 1214.84 1211.69 3.15 32.49 822.93
11 127 135 1214.81 1214.27 0.54 32.53 523.11
Table 5: Solution quality and runtime comparison between two proposed heuristics.
7.1 Sensitivity Analysis by Varying the Number of Nodes
Figure 9 demonstrates the performance comparison results between our RAMF approach and
the four benchmark approaches, where we vary the number of nodes from 40 to 75 in the
34
X-axis. In all the settings, the edge density for the randomly generated directed graphs is
fixed to 0.4 and the adversary’s budget is set to 10. Figure 9(a) shows the net amount of lost
flow for all the five approaches. As expected, the amount of lost flow for the MF approach is
significantly high in all the settings. The RF and AAMF approaches perform equally poorly
in reducing the number of lost flow. The lost flow for the OSP is always lower than other
benchmark approaches. Except for the relatively small problem instances with 40 nodes, our
RAMF approach always outperforms all the four benchmark approaches in terms of reducing
the number of lost flow.
40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
#Nodes
100
200
300
400
500
#L
os
t F
lo
w
MF OSP RF AAMF RAMF
(a)
40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
#Nodes
1
2
5
10
20
50
100
%
Ga
in
 in
 O
bj
ec
tiv
e MF OSP RF AAMF
(b)
Figure 9: Effect of number of nodes on (a) Lost flow; (b) Objective.
Figure 9(b) delineates the percentage gain in the objective value for our RAMF approach
against the four benchmarks in a logarithmic scale. The percentage gain in the objective is
computed as the ratio between the difference in objectives and upper bound on the marginal
gain (refer to equation 39). As clearly shown, the percentage gains in objective for our approach
over all the benchmarks are always positive. The average percentage gains in the objective
value for our approach over the MF, OSP, RF and AAMF approaches are 7.7%, 50.1%, 18.2%
and 14.97%, respectively.
7.2 Sensitivity Analysis by Varying the Number of Edges
We now demonstrate a sensitivity analysis by varying the number of edges in the network.
Figure 10 presents the performance comparison results where we vary the edge density from
0.2 to 0.7 in the X-axis. For these experiments, we consider networks with 50 nodes and the
adversary’s budget is fixed to 10. Figure 10(a) shows the net amount of lost flow for all the
five approaches. We observe a consistent pattern that the lost flows for the MF, RF, AAMF
approaches are always significantly higher than our RAMF approach. While the lost flow for
the OSP approach is lower than our approach for smaller networks with edge density 0.2 and
0.3, our RAMF approach significantly outperforms the OSP approach when the number of
edges increases.
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Figure 10: Effect of number of edges on (a) Lost flow; (b) Objective.
Figure 10(b) delineates the percentage gain in the objective value of the RAMF approach
in a logarithmic scale. The AAMF approach always provides a better quality solution over the
RF approach. The MF approach outperforms the RF and AAMF approaches on larger problem
instances with edge density 0.4 and beyond. As expected, the OSP approach performs poorly
in maximizing the objective value in all the cases. The percentage gains in the objective value
for our approach against all the benchmark approaches are always positive. On an average,
the percentage gains in objective for our RAMF approach over the MF, OSP, RF and AAMF
approaches are 8.2%, 47.3%, 15.2% and 10.5%, respectively.
7.3 Sensitivity Analysis by Varying the Adversary’s Budget
In this thread of results, we present the effect of the adversary’s budget value on both the
performance metrics. Figure 11 demonstrates the comparison results, where we vary the budget
of the adversary from 2 to 20 in the X-axis. Figure 11(a) exhibits the net amount of lost flow
for all the approaches. The amount of lost flow for MF approach increases monotonically from
100 to almost 900 as we increase the adversary’s budget, whereas the number of lost flow for
our RAMF approach is always lower than all the benchmarks and is always bounded by 160.
Moreover, similar to the results presented in §5.3, we observe that the number of lost flow for
our RAMF approach remains steady when the adversary’s budget value goes beyond 14.
Figure 11(b) demonstrates the percentage gains in the objective value for our approach over
the four benchmarks. Similar to the pattern observed in Figure 4(b), the gains in objective for
our approach over the OSP, RF and AAMF approaches almost always reduce monotonically
with the increasing value of Γ (although the pattern is not always coherent as the adversary’s
decision problem is solved sub-optimally). The net difference between the objectives of our
RAMF approach and the MF approach increases monotonically with the value of Γ, which
indicates that the performance of our approach improves gradually if the adversary becomes
stronger. On an average, the percentage gains in the objective of our RAMF approach over the
MF, OSP, RF and AAMF approaches are 10.4%, 38.1%, 21.1% and 17.6%, respectively.
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Figure 11: Effect of the adversary’s budget value on (a) Lost flow; (b) Objective.
In summary, all the three threads of results provide a consistent pattern (similar pattern is
observed with the small-scale results presented in §5) that our RAMF approach reduces the
lost flow significantly over the MF, RF and AAMF approaches. On the other hand, the per-
centage gain in the objective value for the RAMF approach over the OSP approach is always
significantly high. Therefore, from these results we can conclude that even though the two
proposed heuristics solve the adversary’s decision problem sub-optimally, the empirical results
on the large-scale problems replicate the similar trend observed for the optimal results on the
small-scale problem instances.
7.4 Runtime Performance
We now demonstrate the runtime performance of our RAMF approach for different settings
of network size and adversary’s budget. As the number of iterations required to converge
the game may vary randomly for different problems, we show the average runtime for one
iteration of the game. Figure 12 presents the runtime for the RAMF approach in minutes in
a logarithmic scale. In the X-axis, the number of nodes is varied from 40 to 75 (with edge
density 0.4 and the adversary’s budget is fixed to10), the edge density is varied from 0.2 to
0.7 (in a network with 50 nodes and the adversary’s budget is set to10) and the adversary’s
budget is varied from 2 to 20 (in a network with 50 nodes and edge density 0.4). We observe
that the runtime almost always increases monotonically with the network size (both in terms
of the number of nodes and edges). The runtime increases monotonically with the adversary’s
budget until Γ = 10. However, as the sub-problems of the network partitioning based heuristic
approach have relatively small number of edges and the optimization problem tries to identify
Γ
2
potential edges from a small set of edges, the combinatorial space and the complexity of the
sub-problems reduces once the budget value becomes large. Therefore, the runtime starts to
decrease as the value of Γ goes beyond 10.
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Figure 12: Runtime results for varying number of nodes, edges and adversary’s budget.
7.5 Results on RMFGEN Data Set
In the last thread of results, we provide the performance comparison between different ap-
proaches on instances from RMFGEN networks (Goldfarb and Grigoriadis 1988). RMFGEN
networks are widely used for validating large-scale network flow solutions. We employ 7 mod-
erately large-scale RMFGEN networks for the experiment7. As some of the instances are undi-
rected networks, we convert them into directed networks by randomly adding edges until the
network becomes connected (i.e., every node has at least one incoming and one outgoing edge).
As the capacities of edges, U are mentioned as continuous value in the database, we generate
the capacity values randomly from the range of 10 to 50. The unit routing costs for the edges, p
are randomly drawn from the range of 0.01 to 0.1. Finally, we set the adversary’s budget value
to 10 for all the problem instances.
Table 6 elaborates the performance comparison results on the instances of RMFGEN net-
works. For each instance, we show the network details (i.e., the number of nodes and edges,
and the adversary’s budget value), the amount of lost flow and the objective values for all the
five approaches and the average runtime (in minutes) per iteration for the RAMF approach. As
expected, the net number of lost flow for the MF approach is significantly higher than other
approaches for all the instances. The percentage gains in objective value for the RAMF ap-
proach over all the benchmark approaches are always positive. On an average, our approach
improves the objective value by 8%, 50.1%, 47.9%, 39.6% over the MF, OSP, RF and AAMF
approaches, respectively. Most importantly, we observe that our proposed heuristics can scale
gracefully to solve these large problem instances while providing a significant performance
7The data set is collected from http://elib.zib.de/pub/mp-testdata/maxflow/index.html
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Problem Instance Number of Lost Flow Objective Value
Runtime/
Iteration
Name |V| |E| Γ MF OSP RF AAMF RAMF MF OSP RF AAMF RAMF RAMF
elist96 96 348 10 357 169 276 269 145 155.5 61.2 170.9 163.8 216.7 18.30
elist96d 96 539 10 439 343 378 376 213 452.9 307.0 323.6 365.4 508.2 11.26
elist160 160 586 10 438 266 370 370 310 408.7 255.7 345.3 345.4 449.1 28.07
elist160d 160 933 10 481 377 456 454 345 1602.1 1380.1 1356.1 1467.8 1647.7 54.14
elist200 200 818 10 463 344 408 405 352 969.3 737.2 840.8 904.8 1010.9 25.37
elist200d 200 1370 10 476 413 458 458 452 2255.4 1938.3 1823.5 1750.6 2272.8 35.64
elist500 500 2042 10 477 422 453 440 430 3106.8 2799.6 2694.4 2848.2 3126.1 56.11
Table 6: Empirical results on RMFGEN data set.
gain over the benchmark approaches.
8 Concluding Remarks
Modern critical cyberphysical infrastructure systems comprise of various automated devices
which are vulnerable to cyber/physical attacks. To evaluate the resilience and sustainability of
such urban systems, we propose a robust and adaptive network flow model based on a two-
player iterative game between the network administrator and an adversary. In each iteration
of the game, the adversary identifies an optimal attacking scenario to disrupt the flow strategy
generated by the administrator in the current iteration and the administrator computes a robust
flow strategy by considering a set of attacking scenarios revealed by the adversary in previ-
ous iterations. As the computational complexity of the adversary’s decision problem increases
significantly with network size, we propose two novel heuristics, one leverages an acceler-
ated greedy approach and other employs a network partitioning based optimization approach,
to speed up the solution process. The empirical results on multiple synthetic and real-world
benchmark data sets demonstrate that our proposed approach scales gracefully to the large-
scale problem instances and improves the operational efficiency of the network by reducing the
expected lost flow.
In future, this work can be extended in the following two directions: (a) Develop faster
heuristics for solving the decision problem of both the adversary and the administrator, so as
to scale up the solution process to massive real-world urban networks consisting of tens of
thousands edges; and (b) Incorporate precise domain constraints in the optimization models of
both the players to cater to specific real-world application domain. For example, in the context
of urban transportation, a detailed traffic model with congestion effects would make the model
more realistic. However, incorporating precise traffic details (e.g., representing the routing cost
as a latency function of traffic flow to capture the congestion effects) will make our solution
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approach computationally intractable due to non-linearity in objective function and therefore,
efficient approximation methods need to be designed by analyzing the properties of the problem
domain so as to linearize the optimization models.
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Appendix
A Robust Flow Solution
For this benchmark approach, our goal is to proactively compute a robust flow solution by
assuming that the entire flow of an attacked edge is lost. For a fair comparison with other
approaches, we modified the robust flow solution proposed by Bertsimas et al. (2013) to ensure
that a maximum of Γ edges in the network can be attacked. Let x denote the resulting robust
flow scenario andLΓ denote the worst-case lost flow value if the adversary is restricted to attack
a maximum of Γ edges. The optimization model (40) compactly delineates the details of our
robust flow solution, where the inner optimization model computes the value of LΓ as the sum
of the first Γ biggest edge flow values.
max
x
x(t,s) − LΓ where, LΓ = max
µ
∑
e
xeµe
s.t.
∑
e∈δ+v
xe −
∑
e∈δ−v
xe = 0, ∀v ∈ V \ {s} s.t.
∑
e
µe ≤ Γ
0 ≤ xe ≤ Ue, ∀e ∈ E 0 ≤ µe ≤ 1, ∀e ∈ E
(40)
The two components of problem (40) can be combined by taking the dual of the inner
problemLΓ. To achieve this goal, we first compute the Lagrangian function (41) by introducing
the price variables θ and δ. From this Lagrangian function, we construct the dual problem (42).
min
δ,θ
−
∑
e
xeµe + δ(
∑
e
µe − Γ) +
∑
e
θe(µe − 1) (41)
40
max
δ,θ
−
∑
e
θe − δΓ
s.t. θe + δ ≥ xe, ∀e ∈ E
θe ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0
(42)
Putting the optimization models (40) and (42) together, we construct the linear optimization
model (43) that is used to solve the robust maximum flow problem.
max
x,θ,δ
x(t,s) −
∑
e
θe − δΓ
s.t.
∑
e∈δ+v
xe −
∑
e∈δ−v
xe = 0, ∀v ∈ V \ {s}
θe + δ ≥ xe, ∀e ∈ E
0 ≤ xe ≤ Ue, ∀e ∈ E
θe ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0
(43)
B Approximate Adaptive Maximum Flow Solution
In this section, we provide the details of another benchmark approach that computes an ap-
proximate adaptive maximum flow solution by assuming that the flow can be adjusted after the
edge failure occurred. Bertsimas et al. (2013) show that the adaptive maximum flow problem
is strongly NP-hard. Therefore, they propose a scalable linear optimization model to approx-
imately solve the problem. Let x denote the resulting approximate adaptive maximum flow
solution and θ denote the largest edge flow value. In addition, let us define an s − t cut for
the network as a subset S ∈ V of nodes with s ∈ S and t ∈ V \ S. We say that a node v is
on the s-side if v ∈ S and on the t-side if v ∈ V \ S. Let δ+(S) denote the set of outgoing
edges e = (v, w) from the S side such that v ∈ S and w ∈ V \ S and δ−(S) represent the set
of incoming edges e = (v, w) to the S side with v ∈ V \ S and w ∈ S. Then, the capacity
of the s − t cut is defined as: Cap(S) = ∑e∈δ+(S) ue. Let us assume that S denotes the min-
cut solution for the network of interest, i.e., the s − t cut S has the minimum capacity value.
The linear optimization model (44) provides details of the approximate solution proposed in
Bertsimas et al. (2013).
max
x,θ
∑
e∈δ+(S)
xe −
∑
e∈δ−(S)
xe − θΓ
s.t.
∑
e∈δ+v
xe −
∑
e∈δ−v
xe = 0, ∀v ∈ V \ {s, t}
xe ≤ θ, ∀e ∈ E
0 ≤ xe ≤ Ue, ∀e ∈ E
(44)
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Let x∗ be a flow with maximum robust flow value, such that βVal(x∗) ≤ RVal(x∗) for some
β ∈ (0, 1], where Val(x∗) represents the objective value for the administrator if no attack is
executed in the network, and RVal(x∗) denotes the robust flow value of x∗. Further, suppose
x¯, θ¯ be the optimal solution for the optimization problem (44). Let ρ denote the value of (1 −
(1 − 1
n
)n), where n represents the number of nodes in the network. Then, Bertsimas et al.
(2013) show that x¯ is a 1− (((1− ρ)/ρ)((1− β)/β))-approximation of x∗, i.e.,
RVal(x¯) ≥
(
1− 1− ρ
ρ
1− β
β
)
RVal(x∗)
In addition, Bertsimas et al. (2013) show that the resulting flow from problem (44) provides
an α-approximation to the optimal adaptive maximum flow solution. Let x∗ be an adaptive
maximum flow such that βVal(x∗) ≤ RVal(x∗) for some β ∈ (0, 1], and x¯, θ¯ be the optimal
solution for the optimization problem (44). Then, adaptive value of x¯, AVal(x¯) yields a β(1 −
(((1− ρ)/ρ)((1− β)/β)))-approximation for the adaptive value of x∗, i.e.,
AVal(x¯) ≥ β
(
1− 1− ρ
ρ
1− β
β
)
AVal(x∗)
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